# Human group formation in online guilds and offline gangs
# driven by common team dynamic

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Quantifying human group dynamics represents a unique challenge. Unlike animals and other biological systems, humans form groups in both real (offline) and virtual (online) spaces – from potentially dangerous street gangs populated mostly by disaffected male youths, through to the massive global guilds in online role-playing games for which membership currently exceeds tens of millions of people from all possible backgrounds, age-groups and genders. We have compiled and analyzed data for these two seemingly unrelated offline and online human activities, and have uncovered an unexpected quantitative link between them. Although their overall dynamics differ visibly, we find that a common team-based model can accurately reproduce the quantitative features of each simply by adjusting the average tolerance level and attribute range for each population. By contrast, we find no evidence to support a version of the model based on like-seeking-like (i.e. kinship or 'homophily').

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## I. INTRODUCTION

Quantifying the group dynamics of living objects is a fundamental challenge across the sciences [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. Humans represent a particularly difficult case to analyze, since their groups can be formed in both real (offline) and virtual (online) spaces. Such fascinating sociological challenges have attracted the attention of many physicists in recent years under the heading of Econophysics and Sociophysics [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. Indeed, the Econophysics website provides a rapidly increasing repertoire of such investigations [14].

Massively multiplayer online games typically allow individuals to spontaneously form, join or leave a formal group called a guild [15, 16]. The design of the game encourages players to form such groups by making the most rewarding quests (i.e., missions) too difficult to accomplish alone. Millions of people worldwide log on to the world's largest online game (World of Warcraft (WoW)) for the equivalent of several days every week. Indeed, online games are one of the largest collective human activities on the planet and hence of interest from the perspectives of global commerce [17], security [18] and even epidemiology [19]. A seemingly unrelated social phenomenon which is also of great concern, is urban gangs. Urban gangs have been gaining in popularity among young people both nationally and internationally [20, 21, 22]. There are obvious differences in the settings and history of online guilds and offline gangs, however the empirical datasets that we have compiled enable us to perform a unique comparative study of their respective grouping dynamics [15, 16, 22].

Studies of the formation and evolution of groups have long occupied a central position within the sociological and organizational theory literatures, particularly in terms of understanding how individual level characteristics (e.g., demographics, skill sets) shape group dynamics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. Proponents of homophily tend to argue that individuals choose to participate in groups that minimize within-group heterogeniety, since sameness facilitates communication and reduces potential conflict [4, 28, 29, 30, 31]. With respect to stability, previous research has suggested that members of groups that are most unlike the other members of the group are also more likely to exit the group [32]. By contrast, some researchers suggested that rather than minimize diversity among members, members might instead join groups that maximize the diversity of skills in the group (team) [33, 34] since a wider skill set might be more efficient in meeting particular goals [11, 33, 34].

In this paper, we analyze data obtained from street gangs in the offline, real world [20, 21, 22] and Internet guilds in virtual online worlds within massively multiplayer online role-playing games [15, 16, 17]. We develop and employ a physically motivated model to analyze these two high profile, yet seemingly unrelated, human activities. The underlying datasets were obtained from online WoW guilds [15, 16] and urban street gangs in Long Beach, California [22]. They have been separately compiled by members of our team over the past few years through a combination of field-work and data compilation, and are believed to be state-of-the-art datasets

for each respective system. As a result of our analysis, we uncover evidence of a quantitative link between the collective dynamics in these two systems. Although the observable group-size distributions are very different, we find that a common microscopic mechanism can reproduce the observed grouping data for each, simply by adjusting the populations' average attribute property. In particular, we find that the evolution of gang-like groups in the real and virtual world can be explained using the same team-based group formation mechanism. In contrast to the quantitative success of our team-based model, we find that a homophilic version of the model fails. Our findings thus provide quantitative evidence that online guilds and offline gangs are both driven by team-formation considerations, rather than like-seeking-like. Interestingly, each server's Internet Protocol (IP) address seems to play an equivalent role to a gang ethnicity. Given the current public concern regarding the social consequences of intensive Internet game-playing, and separately the current rise in street gangs [20, 21, 22], we hope that the present findings help contribute to the debate by setting these systems on a common footing.

The plan of the paper is as follows: Sec. II gives the main empirical results that are to be modelled. Section III gives the key ideas and a detailed description of our self-organized team formation model. The main results comparing the cumulative group size distributions from our model and real data for both WoW guilds and LA gangs are also presented, in order to establish the validity of our model. Section IV gives further analysis of the non-cumulative WoW guild size distributions for separate servers, as well as the group size distributions for LA gangs of different ethnic groups. These results represent a more stringent test of our model. Section V defines the kinship model and demonstrates its inadequacy. Finally, Sec. VI provides the conclusions and discusses the implications. Note that our philosophy throughout this work was to see if we could identify a minimal model which is consistent with the empirical observations from two very different human grouping activities – one offline and one online. More complex models can of course be built, and may even agree better with particular portions of the empirical data. Likewise, we cannot prove that the model that we propose is strictly *the* minimal model. However, we have explored many similar models, and the one that we present seems the most reasonable, least complicated and provides the best empirical fit.

## II. MAIN EMPIRICAL RESULTS

As explained in Ref. [15], World of Warcraft (WoW) is a massively multiplayer online role-playing game, where players control a character avatar within a virtual world, exploring the landscape, completing quests and interacting with other players. To enter the game, the player



FIG. 1: (Color Online) Internet guilds and street gangs. (a) Empirical data from World of Warcraft on all servers. (b) Cumulative distribution differs significantly from a power-law. Inset shows the averaged churn $C$ of the guilds. (c) Cumulative distribution for Long Beach (i.e. 'LA') gangs. Inset shows the underlying discrete distribution.

must select a particular realm (or server), each of which acts as an individual copy of the game world [15]. Within the game itself, players can group themselves into guilds which may offer an advantage when tackling certain challenges within the game. Guilds are self-organized groups whose size, composition and lifetime are not fixed or pre-determined. Instead, the population tends to self-organize itself into an evolving ecology of such guild groups – and their exact size and composition can be accessed at any time from the electronic records stored on all the participating servers. By contrast, most studies of social group behavior in the real world are plagued by a lack of dynamical information about group size and membership, and the practical restrictions to small samples (as opposed to several million WoW players) and specific geographical locations (as opposed to the global Internet). This explains the attraction of such online games for studying collective human behavior. Within the WoW game itself, each player can be regarded as having certain attributes. While such an attribute list in practice may be an extended vector, we take the minimal model approach of expressing this attribute in terms of the measures of a single variable (see later). The decision to leave or join a guild (i.e. group) does not lie solely at the discretion of the individual player involved – instead, the player and guild in question must find each other to be mutually acceptable.

Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the guild size distribution $N(s)$ and cumulative guild size distribution $N(s' > s)$ for a typical one-month period within the full WoW dataset. The full WoW dataset itself was collected from three different servers – each representing a different game environment – between June 2005 and December 2005, and is representative of the entire game's recent history. There are 76686 agents involved in a total of 3992 guilds spread across three servers: S1, S2, and S3. The cumulative distributions for the separate servers S1, S2 and S3 will be shown later (see Fig. 6(a)). All three servers are based in the US and were selected at random, with the servers' identities anonymized to preserve players' privacy. The vertical axis $N(s)$ is the number of guilds of size $s$. Data is shown using October 2005 as a representative month, however other months show similar behavior as demonstrated in a later section. Interestingly, the distribution is neither a Gaussian nor a power-law. Figure 1(b) confirms that if we were to insist on power-law behavior, the supposedly constant slope in $N(s' > s)$ would vary unacceptably. The inset in Fig. 1(b) shows the quantity called the averaged churn $C$ versus the guild size $s$, where $C$ describes the monthly guild dynamics as follows: The membership of a guild is recorded at the beginning and end of each month, with the churn being the number of players who were members at the beginning of the month but who then left during that month. For guilds which have the same size at the beginning of the month, we then average over the churn values and call this averaged



FIG. 2: (Color Online) (a) WoW guild size distributions $N(s)$ for the months June, August, October, and December 2005. The total numbers of players in these months are 80183, 93127, 76686, and 93322, respectively. (b) The cumulative guild size distributions $N(s' > s)$ for each of the four months.

quantity $C$. We have checked across different months, and have also looked at different measures, in order to convince ourselves that the data in Fig. 1 are typical of the WoW data. Figure 1(c) shows our empirical data for the 5214 members of street gangs in Long Beach, California just outside of Los Angeles. The data are shown for June 2005, but again other months show similar behavior. For convenience, we label these as 'LA gangs'. All gangs are included irrespective of their ethnicity (e.g. Latino). The number of real gangs is much smaller than the number of guilds in WoW. $N(s' > s)$ for gangs is not smooth – nor is it a power-law with a well-defined slope, as shown explicitly in Fig. 1(c).

### A. WoW: Monthly Guild Size Distributions and Churn

To demonstrate that the form of the distribution in October 2005 is typical of the WoW data, we also analyzed the data for all the remaining months. For each month, we repeat the same exercise of counting the guilds

FIG. 3: (Color Online) The average churn $C$ (as defined in text) as a function of guild size in the WoW dataset on a log-log plot, treating the data in all three servers collectively. Data are shown for the months June, August, October, and December 2005. Note the inset of Fig.1(b) shows the same data, but on a linear scale and for October only.

and their sizes for each server. Here, we show the data for several additional months (i.e. June, August and December 2005) as well as October 2005. The empirical data shows that the number of players in each month was 80183 (June), 93127 (August), 76686 (October), and 93322 (December). Figure 2 shows $N(s)$ and $N(s' > s)$ for these four months. The distributions for different months behave in a similar way. The results indicate that the guild size distribution measured at any time during the data collection process, represents a general property of the game during the entire data collection window.

In the inset of Fig. 1(b), we showed the values of $C$ for all the guilds in the three servers (S1, S2, S3) for October 2005. Here, the data of $C$ for June, August, and December 2005 are shown in Fig. 3. The data indicate that the behavior of $C$ versus guild size is almost the same for every month. Thus, the behavior $C \sim s$ is a general feature of the WoW data. We have also analyzed the data for separate servers, and the behavior is again nearly the same. Note that there are necessarily fewer data points for a single server, hence it is more convenient to show the results corresponding to all servers bundled together. Later, we will compare results of $N(s)$ as obtained by our team-formation model with data of separate servers (see Fig. 7).

### B. LA gangs: Different ethnic groups

Our dataset on LA gangs collected in June 2005 consists of the sizes and the ethnicity of the gangs. Putting all the data together, there are a total of 5214 mem-

bers. The cumulative distribution $N(s' > s)$ was shown in Fig. 1(c). The distribution shows a similar shape as for the WoW cumulative guild size distribution. From the information on the ethnicity of the gangs, there are three main ethnic groups that one can identify. For privacy reasons, we label these groups as E1, E2, and E3, with membership 608, 1504, 2552, respectively. Figure 4 shows the cumulative gang size distributions $N(s' > s)$ for the three major ethnic groups. For each of these ethnic groups, the number of gangs is very small (around 10). For this reason, $N(s' > s)$ shows step-like behavior. Comparing with WoW data, the total number of gangs and the number of members in the LA gang data are both much smaller than the corresponding numbers in WoW. In a later section, we will compare the results for our team-formation model with these data of different ethnicity groups (see Fig. 8).

### III. SELF-ORGANIZED TEAM FORMATION MODEL AND MAIN MODELLING RESULTS

We now introduce the key ideas within our model, describe its details, and show that it reproduces accurately the quantitative features of the empirical data. As an overview, Fig. 5(a) shows our generic model of self-organized group formation which acts as the core setup for implementing specific rule-sets for joining and leaving a group – for example, team-formation (see Fig. 5(b)) or homophilic kinship. Our generic model (Fig. 5(a)) creates a heterogeneous population by assigning an attribute $p_i$ to each person (i.e. agent) $i$. Since people may have a range of attributes, we assign each agent a spread $\Delta p_i$ around $p_i$. With the goal of building a minimal model, we choose each $p_i$ to be a single number chosen randomly from a uniform distribution between zero and one. More complicated models can of course be built by assigning, for example, an array of numbers to describe the attributes of a person – however we again stress that we are seeking a minimal model in the present work. The values of $\Delta p_i$'s are random numbers drawn from a single-peaked distribution with mean $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle$ and spread (i.e. standard deviation) $\sigma_{\Delta p}$. The $\Delta p_i$ values are shown in Fig. 5 as horizontal bars around the corresponding color-coded $p_i$ value. We then assign a tolerance to every agent – for simplicity, we choose the same value $\tau$ for each agent. The tree on the right-hand side of Fig. 5(a) applies to both team- formation and kinship versions. In the team-formation version, the group contains agents with complementary attributes (i.e. a team) while in the kinship version a group contains agents with similar attributes (i.e. like with like).

The model can be constructed without considering a particular context. It could represent players in WoW, members in gangs, employees in companies, etc. Figure 5(b) describes what happens in one timestep in

FIG. 4: (Color Online) The cumulative gang size distribution $N(s' > s)$ for LA gangs of three main ethnic groups. (a) Cumulative gang size distribution for gangs with ethnicity E1. The total membership is $N = 608$. (b) Ethnicity E2 with total membership $N = 1504$. (c) Ethnicity E3 with total membership $N = 2552$.

the team-formation implementation of Fig. 5(a), both schematically and mathematically. The kinship model, described later, essentially corresponds to an opposite set of add-on rules to the team-formation model. The team-formation model, as we shall see, works better for the empirical data and we will focus on it in this section. We will use the words 'team' and 'group' interchangeably in the following discussion. However we emphasize that for the portions of the following discussion concerning Fig. 5(a), the word 'team' can be replaced by 'group' since the statements apply equally to the team-formation model and the kinship model.

*Parameters* – Consider a population of $N$ agents or players. The attributes of an agent $i$ are described by a set of numbers $(p_i, \Delta p_i, \tau_i)$, where $p_i$ describes the $i$th-agent's mean attribute. $\Delta p_i$ describes the $i$-th player's range of attributes around $p_i$, or equivalently a breadth of skills around the mean skill. The value of $\Delta p_i$ is independent of the value of $p_i$. Here, $\tau_i$ is a parameter that describes the tolerance of an agent in deciding whether to leave a group, after he compares how close his attributes are to the members of the group. In the present model, we have not included the possible evolution of attributes, although this is an interesting problem for future studies.

*Initialization* – Initially, each agent is randomly assigned his attribute parameter $p_i$, the value of which is chosen randomly from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1. The agents' $\Delta p_i$'s are assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution characterized by a mean $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle$ and standard deviation $\sigma_{\Delta p}$. Each agent is then assigned a value of $\Delta p_i$ from this Gaussian distribution. With $p_i$ and $\Delta p_i$, the agent $i$ covers the attributes $p_i \pm \Delta p_i$, for attributes characterized by the range between 0 and 1. The coverage of attributes is not allowed to go below 0 or above 1, i.e., when $p_i + \Delta p_i > 1$, the upper bound is set at 1 and when $p_i - \Delta p_i < 0$, the lower bound is set at 0. For simplicity, the values of $\tau_i$ are taken to be the same for all agents, i.e., $\tau_i = \tau$ for all agents. The total number

of agents in the system $N$ can be easily taken from the real data. Thus, the model is completely characterized by four physically meaningful parameters: $N, \langle \Delta p_i \rangle, \sigma_{\Delta p}$ and $\tau$.

*Key Ideas and Model Implementation* – In each timestep, an agent $i$ is randomly picked. The attachment of the agent $i$ to a group then follows the rules below.

(a) **For a single agent joining a team** – This step is imposed when the agent $i$ being picked is an isolated agent. In this case, another agent $j$ is randomly picked. The agent $j$ belongs to a team labelled $J$ with $n_J$ members. Note that $n_J = 1$ if $j$ is an isolated agent. The key idea is that it is a two-way consideration when an agent $i$ wants to join a team $J$: the agent must find a team to which his attributes could contribute, and that team must in turn find the agent's attributes acceptable. Moreover, the agent can only see the average attributes of the team to which he is applying. In other words, when joining a team, an agent will be guided by general information about the team (i.e. the average attribute of the team) rather than detailed information about all its members. This mimics the fact that an outsider cannot be expected to be aware of all the details of a team's members before joining, since such knowledge can generally only be gained after being a member of that team. Once inside the team, this information can then be gained either through direct access to insider knowledge, or simply through osmosis.

An agent $i$ therefore assesses a team $J$ which he considers joining, by looking at the average attribute $P_J$ of that team:

$$P_J = \frac{1}{n_J} \sum_{k \in J} p_k, \qquad (1)$$

where the sum is over all members of team $J$. The agent $i$ will find the team suitable if his attributes

**Self-Organized Group Formation Model** (a)

Key Components  Model  Implementation

$p_i$= 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9   $\Delta p_i$= 0.1 0.25

- $i^{th}$ agent randomly assigned attribute parameters $p_i$ and $\Delta p_i$

Agents with specific range of attributes and tolerance

0    spectrum of attributes    1

- $i^{th}$ agent assigned tolerance $\tau_i$
  $\tau_i = \tau$ for all agents
- Each time step, randomly pick an agent $i$

**Team formation**

Teams with members covering different attributes

Happy with current group?
No / Yes
leave    join a better group $J$?
        No \ Yes
next time step   consider group merger   next time step

next time step

**Kinship formation**

Groups with members of similar attributes

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**Dynamics in Self-Organized Team Formation Model** (b)

Key Components  Model  Implementation

**Agent joining a team**
- sees average attribute of target team
- thinks his attributes can complement existing members
- acceptable to team

join?

$P_J$   team $J$

$|p_i - P_J| > \Delta p_i$ , $P_J \equiv \langle p_j \rangle_J$

$i$ can contribute to team $J$

$i$

accept?

team $J$

$f_{i,J} \equiv \langle \theta(\Delta p_i - |p_j - p_i|) \rangle_J < \tau$

fraction of members with attributes close to applicant $i$    tolerance of team $J$

**Agent leaving a team**
- sees attributes of every member
- unhappy with redundancy in attributes
- joins a better team

leave?

$i$   team $I$

$\langle \theta(\Delta p_i - |p_j - p_i|) \rangle_{J(j \neq i)} > \tau$

fraction of members with similar attributes

$i$   team $I$

switch team?

team $J$

$|p_i - P_J| > |p_i - P_I|$  &  $f_{i,J} < \tau$

$i$ can contribute more in team $J$

**Team Merger**

$P_I$   team $I$

$+$

$P_J$   team $J$

$|P_I - P_J| > max\{\langle \Delta p_i \rangle_I , \langle \Delta p_j \rangle_J\}$

average attribute acceptable to merging teams

FIG. 5: (Color Online) Our generic model of group dynamics. (a) The basic model setup, without yet specifying the criterion that an agent uses when seeking to join or leave a group. Two possible extremes are the team-formation model shown in Fig. 5(b), where an agent seeks a group with a suitable niche in $p$-space, and the kinship model (not shown) where an agent seeks a group having members with a similar $p$-value. Details of the implementation and specific rule-sets are discussed in Sec.III.

complement those of the existing members. Therefore, if his attributes are too close to that of the existing members of the team, he feels that he could not contribute much and he will not join the team. The condition that the agent $i$ finds the team $J$ acceptable can thus be modelled by $|p_i - P_J| > \Delta p_i$.

For the team $J$, it will consider whether to enroll agent $i$ as a new member. As an applicant to the team $J$, the team will know the range of attributes that agent $i$ could cover and then assess the potential contribution of agent $i$ to the team. This can be measured by counting the number of existing members with attributes in the range of agent $i$, normalized by the team size $n_J$. Thus, we define $f_{i,J}$ as

$$f_{i,J} = \frac{1}{n_J} \sum_{j \in J} \theta(\Delta p_i - |p_j - p_i|), \qquad (2)$$

where the sum is over all members in team $J$ and $\theta(x)$ is the Heaviside function, i.e., $\theta(x) = 1$ for $x > 0$ and $\theta(x) = 0$ otherwise. In deciding whether to accept a new member, we define a team's tolerance by averaging the individual tolerance of its members, i.e.,

$$\tau_J = \frac{1}{n_J} \sum_{j \in J} \tau_j. \qquad (3)$$

For $\tau_j = \tau$ for all agents, $\tau_J = \tau$. Note that $f_{i,J}$ is a quantity less than unity. If $f_{i,J}$ is large, many existing members in team $J$ have attributes that are close to that of agent $i$ and thus the team tends not to accept agent $i$ as a new member due to redundancy in attributes. Thus, the condition that the team $J$ will accept agent $i$ as a new member is $f_{i,J} < \tau_J$.

Considering joining a team requires two-way consideration, the criteria for an agent $i$ joining a team $J$ are: $|p_i - P_J| > \Delta p_i$ and $f_{i,J} < \tau_J$.

(b) **For an agent leaving a group, finding a better group, or for groups merging** – This step is imposed when the agent $i$ being picked belongs to a group labelled $I$ with $n_I$ ($n_I > 1$) members. The following attempts are implemented **in sequence**.

(i) **Agent $i$ decides whether he can tolerate the team** – After being a member of team $I$ for a while, the agent $i$ has the chance to explore the microscopic details (individual attributes) of the team members. The key idea is that if he finds that there are many members with similar attributes to his, he will leave. To decide whether he can tolerate the team, he looks at the fraction $f_i$ of members in the team with attributes within his range of coverage, i.e.,

$$f_i = \frac{1}{n_I - 1} \sum_{k \in I(k \neq i)} \theta(\Delta p_i - |p_k - p_i|), \qquad (4)$$

where the sum is over all the agents in the team $I$ except the agent $i$ himself. Note that $0 \leq f_i \leq 1$. If $f_i$ is close to 1, then there are too many members with similar attributes and the agent $i$ will have a higher tendency to leave. If $f_i > \tau_i$, the $i$-th agent cannot tolerate the team any more and he *leaves* the group to become an isolated agent. If this happens, the timestep ends.

(ii) Another key idea is team switching. If the agent $i$ finds that he can tolerate the team, it does not necessarily mean that he is very happy with the team. He will try to find a better (more suitable) team to join. An agent $j$, who belongs to a group $J$, is randomly picked. The agent $i$ will then compare whether the current team $I$ or the team $J$ is more suitable for him. He intends to join team $J$ if $|p_i - P_J| > |p_i - P_I|$. This criterion implies that the agent $i$ finds that he can contribute more in team $J$ than in team $I$. Whether team $J$ would accept agent $i$ as a new member is again determined by the criterion $f_{i,J} < \tau_J$, as in step (a). Thus, the criteria for agent $i$ to switch from team $I$ to team $J$ successfully are $|p_i - P_J| > |p_i - P_I|$ and $f_{i,J} < \tau_J$. If there is group switching, the timestep ends. We remark that the steps (b)(i) and (ii) are similar to job hunting. If the job is too bad, then one will simply quit without finding a new job. This is reflected in (b)(i). However, even if the job is acceptable, one tries to look for a better job. In job hunting, it is a two-way process: The employer is looking for someone who can cover the weaker aspects or services in a company, and the employee is looking for a better place. This is reflected in (b)(ii).

(iii) The next key idea is to allow for team mergers. If nothing actually happened in (i) and (ii), i.e., the $i$-th agent does not leave the team $I$, either because he is happy or because team switching does not work, we consider the possibility of allowing two teams to merge. Team $I$ to which agent $i$ belongs, merges with another team $J$ under the criterion $|P_I - P_J| > \Delta P_I$, where $\Delta P_I = (1/n_I) \sum_{i \in I} \Delta p_i$. Similarly, team $J$ considers merging with team $I$ under the criterion $|P_J - P_I| > \Delta P_J$. That is to say, if $|P_I - P_J| > max(\Delta P_I, \Delta P_J)$, then teams $I$ and $J$ merge to form a bigger team. Note that there are two ways to implement mergers. The team $J$ could be the same team that the $j$-th agent belonged to in procedure (ii) above, or a new agent $j$ can be picked

randomly when mergers are considered. Results are nearly identical for the two ways.

To summarize, the key ingredients in our team-formation model are: (i) Teams tend to recruit members to cover a spectrum of attributes; (ii) agent joins a team by assessing his potential contribution to the team; (iii) agent joining a team only sees an average of the attributes of a team; (iv) team accepts new member by assessing his potential contribution; (v) agent leaves a team when there are many members with similar attributes; (vi) agent always looks for better teams where he could contribute more; and (vii) team tends to expand by mergers when its membership becomes stable. Each of these ingredients seems reasonable based on our common knowledge of how people behave in team situations. We remark that this set of rules allowed us to produce results that are similar to the empirical observations for both the WoW and gangs data. If more data become available in order to put further constraints on the model, or if we only want to model a particular subset of the behaviors arising in the full dataset, then the model's rules may either require further elaboration or be further simplified. For example, ingredient (vi) is needed to model the averaged churn $C$ in WoW data while ingredient (vii) is needed to get at the proper sizes of the bigger groups.

Figure 6 highlights the main modelling results. Figure 6(a) shows that excellent agreement is obtained across the entire range of observed group sizes for $N(s' > s)$, between the empirical WoW guild data from Fig. 1(b) (dark blue) and the team-formation model (red) of Fig. 5. Throughout this paper, the model(s) is implemented with the observed number of agents as an input. Here $\tau = 0.69$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.16$ and $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.022$, but we stress that good agreement can be obtained across a reasonably wide range of parameter choices. The remaining panels (Fig. 6(b)-(d)) show the data separated by server. The parameter values used are within 10% of those quoted above. To calculate $C$ in the model, we record the membership for each guild in a run during 0.7 Monte Carlo timesteps (after a transient of 1000 Monte Carlo steps). A Monte Carlo time step is the duration over which each agent has, on average, been chosen once for carrying out the dynamics in the model, i.e. each agent has been given a chance to join or leave a group. We have tried different time windows so as to obtain the averaged churn $C$ in WoW data and found that 0.7 Monte Carlo timesteps happen to give particularly good agreement. One might interpret this by claiming that the timescale over which 70% of agents have a chance to carry out a dynamical update process, represents the real-world timescale for the churn process – however, it is very hard to associate timescales in simulations with specific timescales in the real world. A similar process is followed for the LA gangs in Fig. 6(e). In an analogous way to the breakdown by computer server in Fig. 6(a)-(d), one can break down the



FIG. 6: (Color Online) Empirical data and model comparison for (a)-(d) World of Warcraft and (e) LA gangs. Empirical data are dark blue, and the team-formation model from Fig. 5(b) is in red. The kinship model (light blue) produces a poor fit in both cases.

LA gang data by ethnicity. The fit by gang ethnicity (see Sec.IV later) is good even though the numbers are much smaller than WoW and hence more prone to noise. This surprising connection between ethnicity and server is consistent with the fact that it is essentially impossible to change one's real-world ethnicity or virtual-world server (unless a large fee is paid to WoW in the latter case, and even then it is an irreversible process). It is also intriguing that the best-fit model parameter values are so similar across WoW servers, and across gang ethnicities. This suggests a quasi-universal behavior in terms of the *way* in which people form gang-like groups online and offline. The small observed server-dependences (and ethnicity-dependences) can be explained by players on different servers (and gang members of different ethnicities) perceiving their environments differently, and hence adopting slightly different tolerances. Our team-formation model thus manages to capture all the features of the empirical gang and guild dynamics, including the approximately linear increase of the averaged churn $C$

with guild size in WoW. By contrast, the kinship (i.e. homophilic) version (see Sec.V later) of the model does *not* reproduce the empirical results of either WoW or the gangs, even qualitatively, as demonstrated by the light blue curves in Fig. 6.

## IV. FURTHER ANALYSIS: $N(s)$ WOW GUILD SIZE DISTRIBUTION AND $N(s' > s)$ FOR LA GANGS OF DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS

The agreement of our model with WoW data in $N(s' > s)$ for all and individual servers (Fig. 6(a)-(d)) can be further illustrated by comparing the underlying, i.e., non-cumulative, distribution for the guild size distribution $N(s)$. Since $N(s)$ is less smooth and thus more noisy than the cumulative distribution $N(s' > s)$, we are actually executing a more stringent test of the model by carrying out the team-formation model comparison based on $N(s)$ instead of $N(s' > s)$.

From the WoW dataset, we count the number of players in all the guilds in each server, and also the total number of players in all servers. In each case, we take the number of players as input for $N$ and run our team-formation model. By adjusting the parameters $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle$, $\sigma_{\Delta p}$ and $\tau$ in the model, we obtained the guild size distributions $N(s)$ for each of the three separate servers and for the three servers collectively. Figure 7 shows the $N(s)$ for our model obtained from one run in each of these cases, together with the distribution obtained from the data. The parameters are given in the figure caption. The results from the team-formation model capture the essential features in the WoW guild size distributions.

From the parameters for each of the servers, it can be seen that they are very similar but not identical. This indicates that while the behavior of the players in different servers are not too different, there are slight differences indicating some kind of special characteristic of a server or game environment. We will see that similar features also appear in the LA gang data, when treating ethnicity separately. To the extent to which the server identity mimics an ethnicity, this seems to open up some deeper sociological questions which can be explored in future research on guilds and gangs.

From our attempts in modelling the real data, we now make a few comments on the model as related to the key features in real data: Step (a) (see Sec.III) that sets the criteria for an agent to join a team and a team to accept a new member is the essence of the team-formation model. This is essential in getting the *shape* of $N(s' > s)$. We observed that the shape of $N(s' > s)$, and thus $N(s)$, is more sensitive to the parameter $\tau$. In the WoW data, there is a quantity called $C$. In order to get reasonable values for $C$, a mechanism is required for agents to leave a team or to switch teams readily. Steps (b)(i) and (b)(ii) serve to provide such a mechanism. In order to



FIG. 7: (Color Online) The WoW guild size distribution $N(s)$ in October 2005. (a) Guild size distribution treating all servers collectively. The parameters used for team formation are $N = 76686$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.160$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.022$, and $\tau = 0.69$. (b) Guild size distribution of server S1. The parameters used for team formation simulation are $N = 24033$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.160$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.020$, and $\tau = 0.67$. (c) Guild size distribution of server S2. The parameters used for team formation simulation are $N = 24477$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.160$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.025$, and $\tau = 0.75$. (d) Guild size distribution of server S3. The parameters used for team formation simulation are $N = 28176$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.161$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.020$, and $\tau = 0.70$. Each simulation result is obtained from one particular run of the team-formation model. Note that the parameters for different servers are very similar.

get at the largest size of the guilds in real data, we need a mechanism for guilds to merge. Step (b)(iii) serves this purpose.

If we were to focus *only* on fitting the guild-size or gang-size distributions, and hence decided not to care about simultaneously fitting the churn $C$ in the WoW data, we could construct even simpler versions of our model and yet still obtain group-size distributions similar to the real data. For example, a model with slower team switching and more static groups can be used to get at $N(s' > s)$ similar to real data. However, with our present team-formation model we have managed to fit these size distributions *and* account for the churn. One implication of our work is therefore that previous grouping models which have been proposed to explain time-averaged group sizes in real data *without* churn, should be re-examined once such churn data becomes available. Fitting churn as well as the group-size distribution presents a stringent challenge which relatively few candidate models will survive. Performing studies analogous to our present one, would therefore be a very useful way of reducing the number of competing models. Likewise our own extensive experimentation indicates that it

would be very hard to identify an alternative model to our team-formation one, in which equally high quantitative accuracy was obtained and yet the structure and/or set of microscopic rules were fundamentally different. This gives us confidence that our analysis has indeed identified a realistic group formation mechanism.

We have tested our model against the empirical data of $N(s' > s)$ for LA gangs data, treating all the gangs collectively (Fig. 6(e)). Here, we further test our model for the three major ethnic groups as shown in Fig. 4. Treating the ethnicity as the analogy of servers in WoW, we counted the number of members in the gangs in each of the ethnic groups. For the three major ethnic groups E1, E2, and E3, there are 608, 1504, and 2552 members, respectively. These numbers are used as inputs to our model. We then adjust the parameter values in the model to give a distribution $N(s' > s)$ that resembles the empirical data, for each of the three cases. Figure 8 shows the results for the ethnic groups E1, E2, E3. It is very encouraging that our model manages to capture the main features of the empirical data for the LA gangs, even though the individual gang sizes and number of gangs in each ethnic group are much smaller than for the case of WoW. Note that the parameters (given in the caption) are quite similar for different ethnic groups. Interestingly, using the value of $N$ from the empirical data for each of the ethnic groups, the resulting number of groups in our team-formation model turns out to be similar to that for the empirical data. From the results of WoW guilds and street gangs, we can see that the role of server in WoW has a direct analogy with the role of ethnicity in street gangs.

In summary, our team-formation model reproduces the main quantitative features of the empirical WoW guild size distribution and the cumulative distribution (Fig. 1(a), Fig. 1(b), Fig. 2), in the case when the servers are considered collectively (Fig. 6(a)-(d)) *and* in the case when the servers are considered individually (Fig. 7). The model *also* reproduces the main feature in the group dynamics (Fig. 6(a)-(d)) observed in the empirical data on churn (Fig.1(b) and Fig. 3). Furthermore, the agreement between model and empirical data extents to results in different time windows (i.e. months). Our team-formation model *also* reproduces the main quantitative features of cumulative gang size distributions in empirical data (Fig. 1(c)), taking the ethnicity collectively (Fig. 6(e)) and separately (Fig. 8). Thus, our self-organized team-formation model captures quantitatively the features of the group dynamics resulting from cyber-world interactions, as in the case of WoW guilds, and real-world interactions as in the case of street gangs.

## V. INADEQUACY OF THE ALTERNATIVE MODEL BASED ON KINSHIP

There are lines (in light blue) in Fig. 6(b) for WoW server S1 and in Fig. 6(e) for street gangs that show the results for a kinship model. The kinship model is in many ways the 'opposite' of the team-formation model, and was introduced to explore homophily as a possible alternative group-formation mechanism. In the team-formation model, the teams tend to recruit members with attributes that spread over the whole spectrum of attributes, i.e., the attributes of the agents complement each other. By contrast in the kinship model, groups form around agents with similar attributes. In short, agents tend to dislike being in a group with agents having very different attributes. Here, we briefly discuss the mechanisms in this kinship model.

We can readily modify our team-formation model in order to create a kinship formation model, as follows. The framework in Fig. 5(a) remains the same, and so does Fig. 5(b) in terms of its structure – however we flip the inequalities in Fig. 5(b) for the criteria for an agent joining a group and for a group accepting a member. A kinship model can hence be defined which is diametrically opposite to our team-formation model, and yet can be discussed on the same footing. In step (a) (see Sec.III), the criteria for an agent $i$ joining a group $J$ are: $|p_i - P_J| \leq \Delta p_i$ and $f_{i,J} \geq \tau_J$. These imply that an agent wants to join a group with an average attribute close to his own, and a group wants to accept new members having attributes close to its existing members. In step (b)(i), an agent $i$ cannot tolerate a group $I$ when he finds the members are too different from him. Thus the agent leaves if $f_i < \tau_i$. In step (b)(ii), each agent is continually looking for a better group which has a more similar average attribute to him. So group switching happens if $|p_i - P_J| < |p_i - P_I|$ and $f_{i,J} \geq \tau_J$. Finally, when membership becomes stable, a group tends to expand by merging with groups having similar average attributes. Thus two groups $I$ and $J$ merge if $|P_I - P_J| \leq min(\Delta P_I, \Delta P_J)$.

In fact, for every team formation model that incorporates the idea of agents with different attributes tending to form a team, a corresponding kinship model can be identified, built around the opposite idea of agents with similar attributes forming groups. However the cumulative distribution function obtained from the kinship model cannot capture even the basic qualitative shape of the empirical data. The detailed reason is that the kinship model tends to produce too many groups of small sizes.

## VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

The analysis in this paper contributes to a growing movement within physics which aims to build quantita-

FIG. 8: (Color Online) The cumulative gang size distribution $N(s' > s)$ for LA gangs of different ethnicity. (a) $N(s' > s)$ of membership of LA gangs of ethnicity E1. The parameters used for the team formation model are $N = 608$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.150$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.016$, and $\tau = 0.73$. (b) $N(s' > s)$ of membership of LA gangs of ethnicity E2. The parameters used for the team formation model are $N = 1504$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.142$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.014$, and $\tau = 0.72$. (c) $N(s' > s)$ of membership of LA gangs of ethnicity E3. The parameters used for the team-formation model are $N = 2552$, $\langle \Delta p_i \rangle = 0.141$, $\sigma_{\Delta p} = 0.016$, and $\tau = 0.72$. Each model result corresponds to one run of the team-formation model simulation. Note that the parameters for different ethnic groups are very similar, as was the case for different servers in WoW.

tive models of collective dynamics in social systems using the same minimal-model thinking adopted within physics [35]. We have shown that populations of humans, in two very different settings, can exhibit behaviors which are consistent with a common underlying grouping mechanism. This suggests that many of the collective human behaviors that we observe, might be driven by common endogenous features rather than setting-specific exogenous details.

Specifically, we used detailed empirical datasets to show that the observed dynamics in two very distinct forms of human activity – one offline activity which is widely considered as a public threat, and one online activity which is by contrast considered as relatively harmless – can be reproduced using the same, simple model of individuals seeking groups with complementary attributes, i.e., they want to form a team, as opposed to seeking groups with similar attributes (homophilic kinship). Just as different ethnicities may have different types of gangs in the same city in terms of their number, size, and stability, the same holds for the different computer servers on which online players play a given game.

Our quantitative results provide a novel addition to the group formation debate by being (i) able to reproduce the quantitative features of both the dynamical and time-averaged behavior observed in the empirical datasets, (ii) plausible in terms of the individual-based rules that are used to describe group membership, (iii) robust in terms of its insensitivity to small perturbations in the model's specification and parameter values, (iv) minimal in that the number of free parameters in the model is kept to a minimum, given the available datasets to be modelled, and (v) able to shed light on what mechanistic rules drive people to join and leave such groups in offline and online situations and provide the basis for further investigations.

This close relationship that we have uncovered between gangs and guilds, might be less surprising if it were true that both are populated by a similar sector of society. However this is not the case. Online games are played equally by men and women across all age groups, locations and backgrounds [15, 16, 17], while gangs are mostly populated by teenage urban males from particular backgrounds [20]. Instead, we believe that our results demonstrate a commonality in the *way* in which humans form such offline and online groups. Interestingly this echoes recent claims by international law enforcement agencies concerning the hybrid nature of transnational gangs ('maras'), crime organizations, insurgencies and terrorist groups, whose interactions and activities are now beginning to blur the boundaries between real and virtual spaces [20].

Finally we note that this work throws up the interesting challenge of providing analytic solutions to accompany the empirical findings and numerical simulations. Work is proceeding in this direction, though the difficulty of including internal degrees of freedom, i.e., the model attributes, in general coalescence-fragmentation problems is daunting.

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